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We construct a model where risk shifting can be moder-
ated by capital requirements. Imperfect information about the
level of capital per unit of risk, however, introduces uncertainty
about the risk exposure of intermediaries. Over-estimation of
the capital held by ﬁnancial intermediaries, or the extent of
regulatory arbitrage, may induce households to wrongly infer
from higher asset prices that the fundamentals of risky assets
have improved. This mechanism can notably explain the low
risk premia paid by U.S. ﬁnancial intermediaries between 2000
and 2007 in spite of their increased exposure to risk through
higher leverage. Moreover, the lower the level of the risk-free
interest rate, the more risk is under-estimated.
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non-increasing risk premia while their leverage increased.1 To do
so, we introduce the capital of ﬁnancial intermediaries into the risk-
shifting model developed by Allen and Gale (2000). In their model,
households can invest in risky assets only indirectly, by lending to
ﬁnancial intermediaries. Households require a risk premium on this
loan because they anticipate that ﬁnancial intermediaries will default
in the bad state of the world. However, intermediaries that have lim-
ited liability will take too much risk. A bubble results, as the price of
the risky asset will be higher than in the case in which households,
which do not have limited liability, can directly invest in the risky
asset.
In our model, the amount of risk taken by households through
lending to intermediaries—i.e., the amount and the interest rate at
which they lend—will crucially depend on the level of capital held
by intermediaries. Households, which cannot observe the degree of
risk of the risky asset ex ante, try to infer it from the price of the
risky asset and from their assumption of the level of capital held by
ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the patterns
of risk premia and leverage ratios observed in the United States
between 2000 and 2007 can be understood only if investors under-
estimated the intermediaries’ incentives to take risks. This is likely
when capital constraints are fuzzy, meaning that households can
form wrong beliefs on the level of banks’ capital. We show how
investors may wrongly infer from rising asset prices that the aggre-
gate risk is decreasing, and thus charge a low risk premium on their
loans to intermediaries. This will be the case if investors under-
estimate the degree of regulatory arbitrage, which allows intermedi-
aries to minimize the capital they pledge on risky assets. As argued
by Acharya and Schnabl (2009) and Rochet (2008), one of the rea-
sons why the risk-weighted regulatory capital ratio may be opaque
is that intermediaries use oﬀ-balance-sheet conduits to “play” the
level of capital. Uncertainty about the level of capital of banks then
implies uncertainty about the risk characteristics of their assets. We
show that investors under-estimate the risk of some assets (and thus
charge low risk premia) if they over-estimate the level of capital of
1See Acharya and Schnabl (2009), Blanchard (2008), Brender and Pisani
(2010), Brunnermeier (2009), and Greenlaw et al. (2008).
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intermediaries. This model can therefore show why risk premia did
not increase before the crisis, which is one of the most puzzling styl-
ized facts of this period. In addition, the mechanism we formalize
might be relevant for other periods of major ﬁnancial innovation or
deregulation, when risk-weighted capital positions are likely to be
opaque.
Second, the model points to a risk-taking channel for the impact
of low real interest rates: the misperception of risk is greater at lower
levels of interest rates. This is because the impact of the interest rate
on asset prices is larger when the leverage of ﬁnancial intermediaries
is high. This implies that changes in the level of capital have a larger
impact on the price of risky assets and, in turn, on the perception of
risk by investors at lower levels of interest rates.2 We discuss in this
paper how this channel may translate into a risk-taking channel of
monetary policy.
1.1 Related Literature
This article focuses on the link between the leverage of ﬁnancial
intermediaries, asset prices, and interest rates. It draws on the
results of Adrian and Shin (2010) and Geanakoplos (2009), who have
highlighted the impact of ﬁnancial intermediaries’ leverage on asset
prices. It also provides a theoretical underpinning for the empiri-
cal results of Adrian and Shin (2010), Altunbas, Gambacorta, and
Marques-Ibanez (2010), Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydro´ (2010),
Ioanidou, Ongena, and Peydro´ (2008), Maddaloni, Peydro´, and
Scopel (2008), and Shin (2010), who showed that accommodative
monetary policies leading to low real interest rates are associated
with increased risk taking by banks. We hence provide a theory for
what Adrian and Shin (2010) and Borio and Zhu (2009) call the
“risk-taking” channel of monetary policy.
Among the literature on risk shifting, our paper relates ﬁrst to
the contribution of Allen and Gale (2000), where they showed how
limited liability on the part of debt issuers leads to over-investment
2In fact, the model we use is real, and the interest rate is also real, rather than
nominal. We assume that monetary policy can aﬀect, possibly only temporarily,
the level of the real interest rate on the storage asset. Section 4 discusses the
impact of monetary policy and the savings glut on the level of real and nominal
interest rates in the run-up to the crisis.
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in risky assets. Barlevy (2008) proved that risk shifting also implies
bubbles within more general frameworks of ﬁnancial intermediation
(i.e., when the formation of ﬁnancial contracts is endogenous). He
also generalized risk shifting to a continuous-time dynamic frame-
work. Challe and Ragot (2011) expand the risk-shifting model to the
case in which the supply of loans is endogenous.3
Finally, two recent papers developed models on similar issues.
Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Marquez (2010) developed another model
of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy framed in a moral haz-
ard setup for banks’ capital. Challe, Mojon, and Ragot (2012) show
that the proportion of banks that prefer a risky investment portfolio
over a diversiﬁed, less risky, one decreases with the level of interest
rates.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 documents the styl-
ized facts about the sub-prime crisis. Section 3 presents the model.
Section 4 solves the model and shows in turn the implications of dif-
ferent assumptions on households’ beliefs on risk-weighted capital.
Section 5 discusses robustness of the main conclusions of the paper
for alternative speciﬁcations of the model. Section 6 reports alter-
native explanations of low risk premia in the run-up to the crisis.
Section 7 concludes.
2. Stylized Facts on the Period Preceding the Sub-Prime
Crisis
We underline three major stylized facts from the period that pre-
ceded the sub-prime crisis: the U.S. banking sector increased its
exposure to credit risk and liquidity risk; the perceived riskiness of
U.S. ﬁnancial intermediaries did not increase; and the eﬀective level
of banks’ capital was diﬃcult to assess during the period.
3It is also important to underline the diﬀerence between the risk-shifting litera-
ture and the literature on endogenous credit constraints. The latter analyzes how
asymmetric information introduces external ﬁnance premia and collateral con-
straints. This literature eﬀectively accounts for the ﬁnancial accelerator, either
in the boom phase, when the rising price of collateral relaxes credit constraints
(Kiyotaki and Moore 1997), or in the bust phase, when the collapse in asset prices
tightens the credit constraints considerably (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). How-
ever, these models face some diﬃculties in explaining why there are equilibria
with too much credit and over-investment in the risky asset.
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2.1 Risk Taking in the U.S. Banking Sector
There is now a consensus view that U.S. ﬁnancial intermediaries
increased their risk exposure during the decade leading up to
the crisis. This took the form of an expansion of balance sheets
and increased leverage on the part of U.S. investment banks. For
instance, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) reports
that, between 2003 and 2007, the mean leverage ratio (deﬁned as
the ratio between overall debt and bank’s equity) of the ﬁve major
investment banks4 jumped from 22 to 30. Among these ﬁve invest-
ment banks, only one survived the crisis as a stand-alone institu-
tion.
This expansion in the size of banks’ balance sheets was accompa-
nied by an increase in “oﬀ-balance-sheet leverage,” as documented
in Acharya and Schnabl (2009). This allowed ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries to generate higher proﬁts without additional capital, in spite
of increased potential future losses: in ex ante terms, the unit of risk
borne by each dollar of the U.S. banking system’s equity increased
markedly.
2.2 The Perceived Riskiness of Financial Intermediaries
Was Stable
U.S. banks, however, beneﬁted from very low risk premia paid on
their debt. The spread between bonds of U.S. ﬁnancial companies
and government bonds (ﬁgure 1) shows that the premia paid on
banks’ default risk did not increase from 2000 to mid-2007. The
price of credit risk for banks even declined somewhat between 2002
and 2007.
The change in banks’ expected default frequencies (EDFs) is
another indicator of the ease with which banks accessed market
funding between 2002 and 2007. Banks’ EDFs decreased world-
wide between 2002 and 2007 (see ﬁgure 2), suggesting that mar-
ket investors either assigned lower probabilities to defaults in the
banking sector or required lower risk premia to invest in banks’
debt instruments. The same observation that credit risk for banks
4Lehman Brothers, Bear Stern, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan
Stanley.
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Figure 1. Spread between Ten-Year U.S. T-Bonds and
Ten-Year Bonds of U.S. AAA Financial Companies
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was perceived to be negligible can be made by comparing CDS con-
tracts on U.S. banks intermediaries and on issuers in others economic
sectors.5
To sum up, we observe that, during the years leading up to the
crisis, the U.S. banking sector experienced very favorable funding
conditions and faced very low risk premia on its debt, while at the
same time increasing its leverage (for investment banks) or, more
generally, its exposure to credit risk and liquidity risk via oﬀ-balance-
sheet vehicles. We also note that the increase in banks’ assets was
concentrated among assets that require very low capital funding.
These products, considered to be quite safe by regulatory standards,
were however at the root of signiﬁcant losses for banks after the
beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis.
5This is also particularly striking when comparing banks and non-ﬁnancial
corporate credit spreads in the euro area between 2000 and 2007 (Gilchrist and
Mojon 2014).
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Figure 2. Expected Default Frequency of Banks, Over a
One-Year Horizon (averages by country and groups of
countries)
Source: Moody’s KMV, from Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez
(2010).
2.3 Changes in Capital Requirements
Several factors explain why capital requirements and capital norms
were weak during this period. Most of all, one of the very pur-
poses of Basel II was to authorize banks to reduce their capital base
through the use of internal risk models. Blundell-Wignall and Atkin-
son (2008) and Rochet (2008) highlight the diﬃculty for outsiders to
obtain extensive information on the level of risk borne by ﬁnancial
intermediaries. Such complexity must have led ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries to minimize risk per unit of risk in line with the vested interest
of the industry. Finally, the accounting rules concerning the consoli-
dation of oﬀ-balance-sheet entities were singled out by the Financial
Stability Forum (2008) for creating “a belief that risk did not lie
with arrangers and led market participants to underestimate ﬁrms’
risk exposures.”6
6This issue is actually on the agenda of the G20, and similar concerns about
oﬀ-balance-sheet vehicles have been brought up by academics (see Acharya and
Schnabl 2009), oﬃcial regulators, and central bankers (see, for instance, speeches
of Christian Noyer and Ben Bernanke in 2008).
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3. The Model
There are two dates t = 1, 2. The economy comprises four types of
agents: households, ﬁnancial intermediaries, entrepreneurs, and ini-
tial sellers. We ﬁrst describe the assets available to these agents and
then their investment decision.
3.1 Assets
Agents make their investment choices at date 1 and get asset returns
at date 2. Four ﬁnancial assets are available in the economy:
(i) A storage asset F , which has a constant return τ . This asset
is available in inﬁnite supply.
(ii) A safe asset whose supply XS is variable, and whose return
is rS. The safe asset will be issued by entrepreneurs who
have access to an iso-elastic production function f (.) =
X1−η/ (1 − η) , η < 1.
(iii) A risky asset in ﬁxed supply XR, whose return is R∗. R∗ equals
R with probability π and 0 with probability (1 − π) , which
is the level of “economic risk” in the model. The price of the
risky asset in period 1 is denoted as P . The assumption of
ﬁxed supply simpliﬁes the model and is considered to be the
benchmark case. It is relaxed in section 5.1, as a robustness
check.
Moreover, we make the following technical assumption,
which relates the concavity of the production function η and
the extent of economic risk 1 − π:
η >
1 − π
π
. (1)
This assumption, which ensures the uniqueness of the equi-
librium, is satisﬁed for reasonable values of the parameters.7
7In equilibrium we will obtain f ′ (XS) = rS or XS = r
− 1
η
S . If η is too small,
the volume (and the share) of safe assets held by ﬁnancial intermediaries is quite
sensitive to interest rates. Both the riskiness and the ex ante return of the entire
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(iv) Debt B issued by ﬁnancial intermediaries and acquired by
households.
Financial assets in this economy can be interpreted in the fol-
lowing way:
• The storage asset may, for example, include deposit facilities
at the central bank or cash. Indeed, it allows agents to invest
without limit at a low and constant rate. In what follows, we
will use the return on the storage asset as a proxy for the
interest rate set by the monetary policy authority.
• The safe asset represents investment-grade bonds. It can be
interpreted as a loan to the “real” sector in order to ﬁnance
investment or production.
• Finally, the risky asset encompasses all types of investments
whose expected returns are higher than the return on the safe
asset. It can be either real estate mortgages, junk bonds, or
stocks.
3.2 Agents
3.2.1 Financial Intermediaries
There is a unit mass of ﬁnancial intermediaries (which we also des-
ignate as “banks”) that are risk neutral and receive an endowment
W f at the beginning of date 1. Agents maximize their consumption
over the two periods with a discount factor β, such that
β < 1/τ. (2)
This assumption implies that the intermediaries are comparatively
impatient that they want to borrow in period 1. In addition, they
enjoy a private beneﬁt U from being intermediaries. This bene-
ﬁt guarantees that these agents agree to operate as intermediaries
rather than consuming all their endowment in period 1. They thus
seek to maximize cf1 +βE
[
cf2
]
+U , where cf1 and c
f
2 are the period 1
portfolio could decrease when rS decreases. It implies that the ex ante return
on the whole portfolio could increase when rS decreases, which would generate
multiple equilibria. (1) is a suﬃcient condition relating the curvature η and the
risk π to ensure that it is not the case.
80 International Journal of Central Banking January 2015
and period 2 consumption levels. Financial markets open in period 1
after goods markets. This implies that ﬁnancial intermediaries can
bring to ﬁnancial markets as equity only K of their wealth that is
not consumed in period 1:
cf1 ≤ W f − K. (3)
Financial intermediaries can invest in all existing assets. They
do not invest in the storage asset, because they have access to the
safe asset, which yields a higher return. Thus, their balance sheet
is composed of a risky asset, PXR, and a safe asset, XS, on the
asset side, whereas their liabilities are either equity, K, or debt, B.
The amount K stands for the fraction of resources invested by the
intermediaries themselves in their business. The resource constraint
of ﬁnancial intermediaries is
PXR + XS = B + K. (4)
We assume that ﬁnancial intermediaries are subject to a norm of
“risk coverage” or “risk-weighted capital requirements” by either
ﬁnancial regulation or market discipline.8 They have to invest from
their endowment at least Δ per unit of risky asset:
K ≥ ΔPXR. (5)
Following Allen and Gale (2000), we assume that ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries raise some funds using debt contracts, and that house-
holds, who lend to them, are not able to fully observe the invest-
ment decisions of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Hence they will demand
the same interest rate r irrespective of the size of the loan they grant
to the ﬁnancial intermediary.
Financial intermediaries can default on their debt. Default occurs
when the intermediary’s wealth is negative in period 2. Their second-
period consumption cf2 is thus
cf2 ≤ max{R∗XR + rSXS − rB, 0}. (6)
8Indeed, the level of capital requirements need not exclusively be the one set
by regulators. It can also be the market norm on the acceptable level of capital
for a given level of risk taking.
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They therefore choose their debt level B, the equity K, the compo-
sition of their portfolio (XS, XR) , and their consumption proﬁle c
f
1
and cf2 to solve the following program:
max
K,B,XR,XS,c
f
1 ,c
f
2
cf1 + βE
[
cf2
]
+ U
subject to the conditions (4)–(6).
3.2.2 Households
There is a unit mass of households who are risk neutral and who
are uniformly distributed on the [0, 1] interval. Each household j
receives an endowment WHj at the beginning of date 1. To simplify
the algebra, and without any loss of generality, households maximize
their date 2 consumption only.
As in Allen and Gale (2000), we introduce the following form of
market segmentation. Households cannot invest directly in the risky
asset or in the safe asset, and they can only either invest in the
storage asset or lend to ﬁnancial intermediaries an amount B at the
interest rate r. This assumption captures the advanced skills and
accumulated rents (asset-management abilities, private information,
and so on) needed to trade sophisticated ﬁnancial products.
Households do not know the level of risk in the economy, sum-
marized by π. Moreover, they cannot observe the composition of
the liabilities of ﬁnancial intermediaries, K and B. This assump-
tion reﬂects the inability of each household to observe the extent of
the total indebtedness of ﬁnancial intermediaries. As argued above,
the rationale for this assumption is the complexity of their liabil-
ity structure due to oﬀ-balance-sheet liabilities. Technically, house-
holds know their portfolio, but they do not observe the portfolio of
other households and we do not restrict our analysis to symmetric
equilibria.
The key assumption of our model is that households do not
know the true value of capital requirement Δ, but their belief ΔH
may diﬀer from Δ. This assumption is meant to reﬂect that house-
holds, investors, or even rating agencies have a hard time assessing
the degree of risk eﬀectively borne by ﬁnancial intermediaries. This
opaqueness can be due to regulatory arbitrage or ﬁnancial innova-
tions. In brief, the information set of households comprises prices
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and both risky and safe assets held by ﬁnancial intermediaries (XR
and XS). However, households cannot observe the composition of
banks’ liabilities (K and B).
Each household j chooses the composition of its ﬁnancial port-
folio in order to maximize its consumption:
max
Fj ,BHj ,c
H
j
βE
[
cHj
]
(7)
Fj + BHj ≤ WHj (at date 1) (8)
cHj ≤ ρBHj + τFj (at date 2), (9)
where E [·] is the expectation operator and β is the discount factor.
The expectations are formed on R∗ for a given value ΔH . In the
budget constraints, Fj is the amount invested in the storage asset,
and BHj is the amount lent to intermediaries. We further denote
BH =
∫
j
BHj dj, F =
∫
j
Fjdj, WH =
∫
j
WHj dj, and c =
∫
j
cHj dj the
aggregate amount of loans to intermediaries, the aggregate invest-
ment in the storage asset, the aggregate households endowment, and
the aggregate households consumption, respectively. The stochastic
interest rate ρ that all households receive ex post on their loans to
ﬁnancial intermediaries is uncertain and depends on the probability
of default of intermediaries. Intermediaries default in the bad state
of the world, in which the return on the risky asset is 0, because their
debt burden will be greater than their portfolio invested in the safe
asset. In the event of default, households receive the residual value
of the portfolio of ﬁnancial intermediaries rSXS, so that ρ in case of
default is rSXS/B. When intermediaries do not default, households
get the return r.
ρ =
{
r if no default, with probability π
rSXS
B if default, with probability (1 − π)
3.2.3 Entrepreneurs and Initial Sellers
There is a unit mass of entrepreneurs who maximize period 2 con-
sumption, denoted as ce. They have no wealth and they need to
borrow in period 1 to produce in period 2. Their production func-
tion is f (X) = X1−η/ (1 − η). They borrow an amount denoted as
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XeS from ﬁnancial intermediaries at a rate rS, to maximize their
period 2 consumption ce = f (XeS)− rSXeS. This maximization over
XeS yields the simple relationship
rs = f ′ (XeS) . (10)
Initial sellers are agents who sell risky assets to intermediaries
at period 1, consume, and leave the economy. These agents are only
introduced as a simple way of creating a supply of the risky asset,
and thus an observable asset price, at the beginning of period 1.
Initial sellers have no choices to make and simply consume in period
1 the amount obtained from the sale of the risky asset:
ci = PXR.
In the benchmark model, the quantity of the risky asset is ﬁxed and
equal to 1. We relax this assumption below.
3.2.4 Equilibrium
For given parameters, and a given value of households’ belief ΔH ,
an equilibrium of this economy is a set of prices r, rS, P and quan-
tities Fj , BHj , c
H
j ,K,B, c
f
1 , c
f
2 , XS, XR, X
e
S, and a risk assessment by
households πH , such that (i) quantities solve the program of all
agents at given prices and given households’ belief ΔH , and (ii)
markets clear XR = 1, XS = XeS and B = B
H .
3.3 Pareto-Eﬃcient Equilibria
We ﬁrst derive the set of Pareto-eﬃcient allocations. In order to
do this, we maximize a general welfare function, which weights the
utility of the four types of agents. This can be written, with obvious
notations for the Pareto weights, as follows:
W = ωHβE
[
cH
]
+ ωf
(
cf1 + βE
[
cf2
])
+ ωici + ωeβce (11)
with ωH , ωf , ωi, ωe > 0 and ωH + ωf + ωi + ωe = 1.
Expectations in the objective function are only taken with respect
to the economic risk, R∗ = R with probability π and R∗ = 0 with
probability 1 − π. The feasibility constraints are
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W f + WH = cf1 + F + XS + c
i (12)
τF + f (XS) + RXR = cH + c
f
2 + c
e. (13)
As τ < 1/β, forming the Lagrangian for the maximization of (11)
subject to the constraints (12) and (13), one can check that the
solution has the following properties:
F = 0 and f ′ (XS) =
1
β
.
The allocation of the central planner can be achieved in the decen-
tralized economy if we remove any market segmentation and allow
for lump-sum transfers. In this case, households can directly lend to
entrepreneurs and buy the safe asset. In this equilibrium, the inter-
est rate on the safe asset is 1/β and the price of the risky asset is
equal to its fundamental value P ∗ = βπR.
4. Model Solution
4.1 Asset Prices and Households’ Beliefs
In this section we derive the price of the risky asset by solving the
program of ﬁnancial intermediaries, and provide the intuitions for
the main results of the paper.
We solve the program of ﬁnancial intermediaries under two
assumptions. The ﬁrst is that the capital requirement constraint is
always binding, hence K = ΔPXR. This case is, of course, the one
of interest for this model. The capital norm is binding if ﬁnancial
intermediaries are suﬃciently impatient, i.e.,
πr < 1/β. (14)
This inequality stipulates that the expected cost of the debt πr
(because the debt is repaid only outside the bad state, which occurs
with probability π) must not be too high. If the expected cost of
the debt is too high, intermediaries would want to invest all of their
wealth to decrease their expected debt burden, and the capital norm
constraint would therefore not bind. As r is determined in equilib-
rium, we show below that the condition (14) is fulﬁlled for a wide
range of parameter values.
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The solution of the program of intermediaries yields the equilib-
rium price of the risky asset:
P =
βπR
Δ + βπr (1 − Δ) . (15)
This asset price equilibrium is the main equation of the model. First
note that when there is no capital requirement (Δ = 0), the price
is simply P = R/r, which is the case studied by Allen and Gale
(2000).9 As intermediaries default in the bad state, their demand
for the risky asset is always higher than under the ﬁrst-best equi-
librium. Indeed, since πr < 1/β, one ﬁnds P > P ∗. Asset prices are
thus too high. Second, when capital requirements increase, the price
of the risky asset decreases. Taking r as given, increasing Δ implies
a cost in the form of additional foregone consumption in period 1,
an eﬀect that dominates the reduction in size of the loan that needs
to be repaid with probability π.
Thus, in partial equilibrium, the price of the risky asset can
increase for two reasons: either because π increases, which means
that the expected return of the risky asset is higher, i.e., “funda-
mentals are better,” or because Δ decreases (the amount of ex ante
risk shifting increases).
Maximization with respect to the demand for the safe asset XS
implies that the funding cost of ﬁnancial intermediaries is equal to
the return on the safe asset, as in Allen and Gale (2000): r = rs.
This is necessary and suﬃcient in order to avoid inﬁnite riskless
proﬁt opportunities on the part of ﬁnancial intermediaries, while
guaranteeing a positive demand in equilibrium.
The demand for the safe asset implies
f ′ (XS) = rS = r =⇒ XS = [f ′(r)]−1 . (16)
9In their model, Allen and Gale show how incomplete debt contracts limit
debtors’ losses in the bad state of the world (losses fall on lenders). In other
words, debt contracts act as call options for borrowers. This implies that borrow-
ers only focus on the good state of the world when deciding the composition of
their portfolio: the share of the portfolio at risk is higher and the price of risky
assets is inﬂated above its level in a world without segmentation or incomplete
contracts.
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The previous equalities are valid irrespective of the beliefs on the
part of households about the economic environment. These beliefs
will, however, determine the interest rate charged by households.
The basic assumption of the model is that households infer the
probability of default from their observation of the risky asset price
and their belief on risk-weighted capital ΔH . The price of the asset
is given by (15) for the true value of Δ and π, because it results from
a no-arbitrage condition for intermediaries, who know the real value
π and the real Δ. Households deduce a value of πH that is consistent
with price P and their belief ΔH . It therefore follows that
P =
βπR
Δ + rβπ (1 − Δ) =
βπHR
ΔH + rβπH (1 − ΔH) . (17)
We deduce the following inference for households:
πH = π
ΔH
Δ + rβπ (ΔH − Δ) . (18)
Due to the condition rβπ < 1, if ΔH > Δ, then πH > π, and if
ΔH < Δ, then πH < π. In addition, if ΔH = Δ, then πH = π. In
other words, if households over-estimate risk-weighted capital, they
under-estimate the risk, and if they under-estimate risk-weighted
capital, they over-estimate the risk. Moreover, when households have
correct beliefs concerning risk-weighted capital (i.e., ΔH ≡ Δ irre-
spective of the value of Δ), they correctly infer the right level of
aggregate risk.
We now solve the model for the various cases concerning the
relationship between ΔH and Δ.
4.2 Symmetric Information Over Δ
If both households and ﬁnancial intermediaries have correct beliefs
on Δ, households can deduce the level of aggregate risk π, as shown
in the discussion of equation (18). In addition, knowing Δ, they
deduce K = ΔPXR. They can also infer the amount of aggregate
debt B from the budget constraint of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
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With the expression for XS given by (16) and r = rS, the no-
arbitrage condition for household can be written as
πr + (1 − π) rf
′−1 (r)
B
= τ. (19)
This condition states that average return for each unit invested
in ﬁnancial intermediaries (taking into consideration the possibility
of default) should be equal to the return on the storage technology.
We introduce the main conclusions of the paper as propositions. All
proofs are presented in the appendix.
Proposition 1. If ΔH ≡ Δ, households’ expectations of the aggre-
gate risk are correct (πH = π) and
∂B
∂Δ
< 0 and
∂(r − τ)
∂Δ
< 0.
Proposition 1 states that decreasing capital per unit of the risky
asset increases both the volume of debt of intermediaries and the
credit risk premium, r − τ . This result is due to two eﬀects. First,
the overall general equilibrium eﬀect of a decrease in Δ is an increase
in the intermediaries’ debt level, as ﬁnancial intermediaries have a
greater incentive to increase their exposure to risk by issuing debt.
Second, when Δ decreases, households understand that the residual
value of the assets they receive in the event of default decreases.
They hence request a larger default risk premium r − τ to com-
pensate for the increased cost of default. This version of the model
is therefore not consistent with the stylized facts of the sub-prime
cycle. As shown in ﬁgure 1, banks have been able to borrow at lower
risk premia during the ﬁve years leading up to the crisis, in spite of
increasing leverage and decreasing risk-weighted capital with respect
to, for instance, U.S. housing loans.
To summarize, the change in Δ can account for an increase in the
debt level of banks, but it cannot explain the path of the risk premia
between 2000 and 2007. We therefore assert that risk shifting, per
se, is not suﬃcient to replicate the stylized fact of the sub-prime cri-
sis. Before the crisis, banks and ﬁnancial intermediaries beneﬁted in
fact from extremely favorable funding conditions, which would not
be the case if changes to risk-weighted capital were fully understood
by investors.
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The next sections will discuss the more likely cases where capital
constraints are fuzzy. In view of the complexity of ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries’ balance sheets, and oﬀ-balance-sheets transactions, this
case is more likely to reﬂect the real world. Households may either
over-estimate or under-estimate Δ.
4.3 Over-Estimation of Δ
We now assume that households believe that the level of risk-
weighted capital is higher than that actually faced by ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries: ΔH > Δ. In this case, the amount of capital pledged by
ﬁnancial intermediaries is lower than that expected by households,
and households over-estimate the probability of success of the risky
asset πH > π, due to the relationship (18).
Households form their inference about the residual value of their
portfolio, rXS
BH
, in the following way. First, from the observation of
the amount of risky assets in the economy XR, and from their belief
about ΔH , households infer that the level of the capital of ﬁnancial
intermediaries is
KH = XRΔHP.
Second, from the budget constraint of ﬁnancial intermediaries,
households form the following expectation about the amount of debt:
BH = XS + PXR
(
1 − ΔH) . (20)
Third, the no-arbitrage condition for households must now be
written according to their expectations:
πHr +
(
1 − πH) rXS
BH
= τ. (21)
Using equation (18) in order to substitute for πH , the expressions
for XS given by (16), the value of B implied by the balance sheet
constraint of the intermediary, and the fact that rS = r, we obtain
an equation for the equilibrium interest rate r which depends only
on known parameters and functional forms.
In order to obtain analytical insight, we assume that households’
belief about capital requirement is not too far away from the true
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one, i.e., we assume that ε ≡ ΔH − Δ is small. In this case, we can
perform ﬁrst-order approximations.
Proposition 2. If ε ≡ ΔH − Δ is small, we have
∂πH
∂ε
> 0,
∂ (r − τ)
∂ε
< 0 and
∂B
∂ε
> 0.
Proposition 2 summarizes the eﬀect of an increase in households’
estimation of risk-weighted capital ΔH − Δ (or a decrease in risk-
weighted capital Δ keeping belief ΔH constant). Households become
more optimistic about the risk of the asset πH . They hence charge a
lower risk premium, which allows ﬁnancial intermediaries to borrow
more. This proposition illustrates how unexpected regulatory arbi-
trage might explain why, before the crisis, banks increased the risk
they took without being sanctioned by higher risk premia.
Proposition 3. If ε ≡ ΔH − Δ is small and positive, we have
∂πH
∂τ
< 0,
∂ (r − τ)
∂τ
> 0.
When households over-estimate risk-weighted capital, a decrease
in the risk-free rate τ exacerbates their optimistic bias about the
risky asset. The reason stems from equation (17). When the level of
the risk-free rate τ decreases, the lending rate to ﬁnancial interme-
diaries r also decreases under general conditions. The asset price P
increases and households assign part of this increase to a decrease
in the riskiness of the asset, leading to an increase in borrowing by
ﬁnancial intermediaries. The model can therefore explain one of the
channels through which monetary policy might aﬀect risk taking by
ﬁnancial intermediaries.10
The predictions of the model for risk perception are actually
consistent with the empirical results produced by Altunbas, Gam-
bacorta, and Marques-Ibanez (2010). They found that the expected
10Borio and Zhu (2009) coined the term “the risk taking channel of monetary
policy” that they deﬁne as “the impact of changes in policy rates on either risk
perceptions or risk-tolerance and hence on the degree of risk in the portfolios, on
the pricing of assets, and on the price and non-price terms of the extension of
funding.”
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default frequencies, and other market-based measures of bank’s risks
as perceived by ﬁnancial market participants, react positively to
changes in interest rates: a lower interest rate leads investors to per-
ceive banks as less risky. Turning to banks’ risk taking, which may be
interpreted as banks exploiting their ability to borrow cheaply from
ﬁnancial markets, a number of recent studies—including Ciccarelli,
Maddaloni, and Peydro´ (2010), Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro´
(2008), and Jimenez et al. (2007)—show that credit standards are
correlated to the level of interest rates. Lower interest rates there-
fore imply lower credit standards, including for customers who are
perceived as presenting a higher credit risk.
It is important to stress, however, that in our model the impact
of the level of interest rates on risk perception and risk taking does
not depend on the source of variation in interest rates. The interest
rate in the model is real and can, therefore, be inﬂuenced by several
factors. During the decade leading up to the crisis, several expla-
nations were put forth in order to explain the low level of nominal
and real interest rates. According to Taylor and Williams (2009),
U.S. monetary policy was overly accommodative. Bernanke (2010),
however, stressed instead that China’s excess savings have played a
major role in keeping the long end of the U.S. yield curve at com-
paratively low levels. Either of these factors may in turn have been
ampliﬁed by the phenomenon of “search for yield,” as emphasized
by Rajan (2005). We do not take a position on these alternative
possible drivers of the level of interest rates, and only stress that the
endogenous mechanism described in our model would hold for either
of them.
What the model highlights, however, is that the search for yield
and risk taking can in part result from the wrong inference of risks
from asset prices. This is because interest rates are central in the
valuation of assets and the inference on risk incentives. It points to
the interdependence of interest rates, asset prices, and capital-based
prudential policies in a world where risk incentives and exposure
cannot be assessed with certainty.
4.4 Under-Estimation of Δ
The previous section focused on the case in which households over-
estimate capital and wrongly infer the level of collapse risk. We show
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that this is consistent with the stylized facts on the pre-crisis period.
The symmetric case is, however, also interesting.
The case of excess caution, where the risk-weighted capital of
banks is believed to be too low, may help understand other periods
of history. In a recent paper, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) show
that households who experienced the Great Depression are less likely
to invest in stock markets or participate in ﬁnancial markets. Our
model is able to rationalize this behavior by an under-estimation
of the constraints imposed on banks after the Glass-Steagall Act.
Anticipating that both the banking system and risky assets are more
risky than they really are, households ask for higher returns or guar-
antees to compensate for the perceived risk. Empirical support for
the view that investors’ appetite for risk varies over time can also
be found in Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), who show large and
persistent swings in the price of risk, deﬁned as the part of bond
risk premia that are not explained by “fundamentals” on the risk of
default, where the latter is derived from the Merton’s valuation of
ﬁrms’ stocks as an option to default. The price of credit risk was con-
sistently negative from 2003 to 2007. It has also remained positive for
several periods, such as around 2000, around 2008, and throughout
the 1980s (see ﬁgure 1 in Gilchrist and Zakrajsek 2012). Again, the
periods of over-estimation of risk may be due to an under-estimation
of the capital constraints imposed on ﬁnancial intermediaries.
5. Alternative Speciﬁcations of the Model
5.1 Elastic Supply of the Risky Asset
In the baseline model, we assume that the supply of the risky asset
was ﬁxed, i.e., XR = 1. This section shows that the results are robust
even if this supply may respond to prices, provided this response is
not too large.
Let us now assume that instead of being sold in period 1 by
initial sellers, the risky asset is produced by a new class of entrepre-
neurs. There is a unit mass of such entrepreneurs. They have access
to a risky technology and consume in period 2. The risky technology
yields g (Y ) = λY 1−θ/ (1 − θ) , with a probability π in period 2, or
fails to produce anything with probability 1 − π. We assume that
risks are perfectly correlated among these entrepreneurs.
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They sell the risky asset to ﬁnancial intermediaries in period 1,
at a unit price P . One unit of risky asset costs P in period 1 and
pays oﬀ R with a probability π and 0 with a probability 1 − π in
period 2. Entrepreneurs choose how many units XR of risky asset
to sell. And they have no alternative to investing it. Their objective
function is to maximize their period 2 consumption, denoted as cR,
with cR = π [g (PXR) − RXR]. It yields
XR =
(
λ
R
)θ
P
1−θ
θ .
Our baseline model is a special case where θ = 1, and λ = R. It can
be shown that our results on the eﬀects of wrong beliefs (proposi-
tion 2) and the change in the risk-free rate τ (proposition 3) are still
valid when θ is not too low. For low values of θ, P cannot deviate
enough from its fundamental value for obvious reasons, so wrong
beliefs concerning Δ have negligible eﬀects.
This extension is important because ﬁnancial innovation is likely
to be stimulated when investors are optimists, or when either interest
rates or risk premia are low. In the case of the U.S. sub-prime crisis,
the supply of several forms of risky assets increased. More houses
and condos were constructed, especially in states where housing
prices increased the fastest (Florida, Nevada, etc.). The “originate-
to-distribute” business model exposed mortgages to U.S. households
that had decreasing creditworthiness. And more mortgage-backed
securities and collateralized debt obligations that packaged these
mortgages were sold to investors. The under-estimation of credit
risk, as shown in ﬁgure 1, carried on for as long as the price of risky
assets increased, i.e., the supply could not catch up with demand.
5.2 Risk about the Eﬀectiveness of Capital Requirements
Our baseline model assumes that households may have wrong beliefs
about the eﬀectiveness of capital requirements, i.e., how much loss
would be absorbed by holders of banks’ stocks in the bad state of
the world. Relaxing this assumption, while feasible, would greatly
increase the complexity of the model. It is indeed possible to intro-
duce an additional shock on the level of capital requirement. This
shock is known by banks but unknown to the households. In this
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framework households form on average correct expectations about
the average level of capital requirements. For an unexpected neg-
ative shock to this level, we would ﬁnd the same results as in the
current model where ΔH > Δ. We chose a simpler structure to
derive theoretical results in a transparent way.
5.3 Uncertain Return
In the baseline model, we assumed that the return in case of success
R was known but that the probability distribution of risk π was
unknown. An alternative modeling strategy would be to consider π
as known but that the return R = R (e) is uncertain and aﬀected by
the private actions of ﬁnancial intermediaries. In this case, the main
result would be preserved: if households know capital requirements
Δ, they can infer from asset prices the real return R (e) and thus the
private action e. Changes in capital requirements may drive changes
in private actions, but these changes would be anticipated and thus
reﬂected in risk premia. Alternatively, when capital requirements are
unknown, changes in capital requirements, and thus in equilibrium
prices, will be partly understood to be a higher return and would
thus bias the estimate of credit risk. Although it may be hard to
distinguish between uncertain return and uncertain probabilities for
speciﬁc assets, our modeling choice is motivated by the direct evi-
dence of a sharp change in the expected probability of default during
the crisis, as mentioned in section 2. Our model is thus designed to
explain this bias in expectations of default.
5.4 Return and Risk
In our model, a change in the probability of default π aﬀects both
the mean and the variance of the return on the risky asset. As agents
are risk neutral, the eﬀect on the variance does not aﬀect prices, but
it would still be useful to express the model in order to analyze the
eﬀect of a change in the mean return keeping its variance constant. It
is possible to do so by introducing an additional risk. Let us assume
that the risky asset is equal to 0 with a probability 1− π and equal
to a stochastic variable R˜ with a probability π. R˜ has a mean R and
is uniformly distributed in the support [R− δ;R+ δ]. If the support
is small enough, default will occur only when R is equal to 0. It is
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then possible to jointly choose π and δ to study the eﬀect of a change
in mean which keeps the variance constant.
6. Alternative Explanations of Low Risk Premia
6.1 Expectations of Bailouts
The model focuses on uncertainty of capital requirements to explain
why risk premia were low before the crisis. An alternative expla-
nation is that investors expected to be collectively bailed out by
governments and central banks. Farhi and Tirole (2012) propose a
model in which ﬁnancial institutions coordinate their exposure to
risks in order to increase systemic risk, and therefore the likelihood
that public authorities will bail them out. Their model explores the
issue of risk shifting from investors to taxpayers. We focus instead
on the shifting of risk from banks to bondholders.
It is clear that the concepts of “too big to fail” or “too inter-
connected to fail” are likely to have inﬂuenced investors. The expec-
tations of bailouts may have played a role in the evolution of risk
premia. In particular, the big change in expected default frequency
after the collapse of Lehman in September 2008 may have been due
partly to a revision in the perceived probability of a public bailout
and partly to a reassessment of the underlying risk. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no evidence that allows us to rule out that
these phenomena may have inﬂuenced risk premia.
It should also be stressed, however, that the political process
that leads to bailing out ﬁnancial institutions is uncertain. Finan-
cial institutions usually pay a credit risk premia with respect to
the Treasury. These premia vary over time for a number of reasons,
including the collective moral hazard hypothesis of Farhi and Tirole
(2012) and the one we propose in this paper.
6.2 General Under-Estimation of Risk
Another explanation of low risk premia would be that all agents,
including ﬁnancial intermediaries, under-estimated the risk of
default on housing assets. This is, for instance, the view held
by Schleifer (2011). He stresses that the ex post losses of the
ﬁnancial industry were so large as to discard the “expectation of
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bailouts” hypothesis as well as hypotheses, like the one we present
in this paper, which highlight asymmetry of information between the
ﬁnancial industry and non-ﬁnancial agents. Again, a global under-
estimation of risk cannot be rejected, and it may be hard to claim
that banks correctly anticipated the real risk of all assets. However,
some evidence, such as legal actions against ﬁnancial intermediaries,
suggests that ﬁnancial intermediaries and households did not all have
the same information. In 2007 Chuck Prince, then chairman of Citi-
group, declared: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things
will be complicated. But, as long as the music is playing, you’ve got
to get up and dance. We are still dancing.” (Financial Times 2007)
This is highly suggestive that banks knew they were taking
risks.11
7. Concluding Remarks: Can the Model Explain the
Buildup of Financial Fragility?
In this paper we show that the combination of risk shifting and fuzzy
capital requirements may explain one of the sub-prime crisis puzzles,
i.e., that ﬁnancial intermediaries were able to increase their exposure
to risk without having to pay higher risk premia on their debt.
In an opaque banking system where regulatory constraints are
diﬃcult to observe, an increase in asset prices can be interpreted as
a lower aggregate risk in the economy while, in fact, asset prices are
driven by greater risk taking on the part of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
We also showed that this model gives rise to a risk-taking channel of
low interest rates, which reduces the perceived risk of some agents
and increase the exposure to risk of others.
Our result resonates with the popular notion that ﬁnancial mar-
kets participants can draw incorrect inferences about risks. In partic-
ular, when the eﬀectiveness of capital requirements is not observable
by agents, the signal extracted from market prices is contaminated
by noise coming from excessive risk-taking behavior. In our model,
11Another paper elaborating on the information asymmetry between ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries and households is Shleifer and Vishny (2010). In this paper,
the expectations of households are taken as given. Instead, we endogenize them
through an inﬂation-extraction problem.
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market forces, by themselves, do not result in an optimal allocation
of capital, because risk incentives are not correctly understood.
We see two obvious extensions to our model. First, it is possible
to endogenize the expectations of households within a dynamic set-
ting in which households learn about the relevant parameters. The
results of our model would still hold if the priors of the households
were far enough from the true parameters. The resulting dynamics
of their learning process should generate useful patterns. Second, it
would be interesting to study the political economy aspects associ-
ated with the assessment of risk within such an economy. Sellers of
the assets have an incentive to under-estimate the degree of risk, or
to generate complexity in order to increase the cost of signal extrac-
tion. This should be anticipated by households, who would then look
for other sources of information. It is in this context, for example,
that we interpret the current discussion about rating agencies to
be part of the debate on the management of risk expectations in
economies where intermediaries play an important role.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Since π ∈]0, 1[ and XS < B, the no-arbitrage condition (19) implies
r > τ . Equality (19) can be written as
B(r) =
(1 − π) rXS
τ − πr . (22)
We can substitute K, XS, and P with their equilibrium values given
by equations (15) and (16) to obtain an expression B (r):
B (r) =
(1 − Δ)R
Δ
βπ + r (1 − Δ)
XR + f ′−1 (r) . (23)
Let us deﬁne: Θ ≡ Δ1−Δ . Then from (16), (23), and (19), we ﬁnd
that the real interest rate r satisﬁes the equality
τ = πr + (1 − π) (Θ + βπr) r
1−1/η
βπRXR + Θr−1/η + βπr1−1/η
.
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This last equality implicitly deﬁnes the interest rate by equality
M (r) = Θ, where
M (r) ≡ βπ
(
(τ − πr) r1/ημXR
r − τ − r
)
.
In the equilibrium under consideration, πr < τ < 1 and r > τ . As a
consequence, we can check that a suﬃcient condition for M ′ (r) < 0
is η > 1−ππ , which is (1). In this case, the equality M (r) = Θ implies
that r is decreasing with Δ.
From equality (19), one ﬁnds B (r) = 1−πτ−πrr
1− 1η . After some
algebra, we ﬁnd that B (r) increases with r when (1) is fulﬁlled. As
a consequence, ∂B∂r > 0,
∂(r−τ)
∂Δ < 0, and
∂B
∂Δ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
Denote ε = ΔH −Δ. From equations (16), (21), (17), (18), and (20)
we ﬁnd that the real interest rate satisﬁes G (r, τ,Δ, ε) = 0, where
G (r, τ,Δ, ε) ≡ βπ
⎡
⎣
(
τ − πr Δ+εΔ+rβπε
)
Rr
1
η
r − τ − r
(
1 − ε
1 − Δ
)−1⎤⎦
− Δ
1 − Δ − ε. (24)
As τ,Δ, ε are given parameters, the equality G (r, τ,Δ, ε) = 0 deﬁnes
the equilibrium interest rate as a function of the parameters of
the model. Studying the derivative of the function G, we ﬁnd the
following signs for the derivatives (with obvious notations):
G
(
r−, τ+,Δ− , ε−
)
= 0.
As a consequence and by the implicit function theorem, we ﬁnd
that r has the following variations: r = r
(
τ
+
,Δ− , ε−
)
. This proves
∂(r−τ)
∂ε < 0.
Next, the anticipated probability can be written as πH =
π (ε + Δ) / (Δ + rβπε) from (18). As a consequence, one ﬁnds the
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following variations: πH = πH
(
r−, ε+
)
. This proves ∂π
H
∂ε > 0 (as r
decreases when ε increases).
Finally, the budget constraint of ﬁnancial intermediaries,
together with the price (17), gives the debt level B:
B = r−
1
η +
βπR
Δ
1−Δ + rβπ
.
One can easily deduce the variation B = B
(
r−
)
and r =
r
(
τ
+
,Δ− , ε−
)
. We have thus the variations B = B
(
τ−, ε+
)
.
Proof of Proposition 3
From the proof of proposition 2, we obtain r = r
(
τ
+
,Δ− , ε−
)
and
πH = πH
(
r−, ε+
)
. As a consequence, we ﬁnd ∂π
H
∂τ < 0. The proof of
the inequality ∂(r−τ)∂τ > 0 requires more algebra. This inequality is
ﬁrst proven for ε = 0. Then, a continuity argument is invoked. From
the deﬁnition (24) and the equality G (r, τ,Δ, ε) = 0, we ﬁnd
r − τ = r
1 − π Δ+εΔ+rβπε
1
μ1r
1
η
[
Δ
1−Δ
1
βπ + r
]
1
1− ε1−Δ + 1
.
Taking the derivative with respect to τ and setting ε = 0, we
easily ﬁnd ∂(r−τ)∂τ > 0. By continuity, this inequality is fulﬁlled when
ε is small.
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